In defence of simplified PES designs by Wells, G. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In defence of simplified PES designs
Citation for published version:
Wells, G, Ryan, C, Fisher, J & Corbera, E 2020, 'In defence of simplified PES designs', Nature
Sustainability. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-020-0544-3
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1038/s41893-020-0544-3
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Nature Sustainability
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 03. Dec. 2020
In defence of simplified PES designs  1 
G. Wells, C. Ryan, J. Fisher and E. Corbera. 2 
Corresponding author: Geoff Wells, geoff.wells@su.se 3 
 4 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes are underperforming. Wunder et al.1 conclude that 5 
this is because many projects are allowing local politics, rather than economistic theory and 6 
evidence, to dictate who participates, and how they are paid and sanctioned. While we appreciate 7 
Wunder et al.’s analysis, we view that their work downplays key evidence about the importance of 8 
maintaining the legitimacy of PES schemes amongst local participants, and of the wider range of 9 
social-ecological factors that may explain variability in PES effectiveness. We argue that 10 
simplification of such schemes, by enhancing local transparency and acceptability, can in fact be 11 
scientifically justified and central to project effectiveness. 12 
Understanding what determines the effectiveness of a PES project is a research frontier. Wunder et 13 
al. conclude that the three PES ‘desirable design features’ of spatial targeting, payment 14 
differentiation and sanctioning are often being overly simplified in order to maintain local political 15 
support. Wunder et al. then argue that this may explain why many PES schemes are not effective. 16 
Our main concern is that the framing of the article appears to lead to an unwarranted (although 17 
perhaps unintended) relegation of social concerns, below their three desirable design features. The 18 
authors conclude that projects may be reluctant to sanction non-compliance, and to adopt more 19 
complex differentiation of payments, in order to maintain local perceptions of fairness and 20 
community support (henceforth, ‘local legitimacy’). In contrast to this view, both theory2 and 21 
observations3 show that local perceptions of project legitimacy are central to PES effectiveness—22 
without it, projects can fail in their land use objectives. Further, evidence suggests that to achieve 23 
local legitimacy, PES projects often need to adopt procedures that are easily understandable, and 24 
seen as fair, by local participants4. This is the rationale for simplified approaches to the desirable 25 
design features of Wunder et al. 26 
Wunder et al. do implicitly address some aspects of local legitimacy through their discussion of 27 
distributional equity issues and the political sensitivities of sanctioning. We argue, however, that the 28 
overall effect of their framing causes local legitimacy to be treated far less prominently than the 29 
empirical PES literature warrants: the conclusions mainly present such concerns as a cause of 30 
‘deficiencies’ in design, where programmes have departed too far from their three design principles. 31 
While there is ongoing debate about the extent to which local legitimacy concerns should be 32 
prioritised over other issues, we propose that there is a growing consensus that accounting for local 33 
legitimacy (and related equity) is at least one of the main enabling factors for PES effectiveness5. We 34 
suggest that local legitimacy be considered an additional theoretical pre-condition for effective PES, 35 
alongside Wunder et al.’s other principles. 36 
The treatment of non-compliance in the article provides an example of how explicit consideration of 37 
local legitimacy may allow for more nuanced and locally grounded understandings of PES design. 38 
Wunder et al. categorise many of the projects in their sample as having ‘never’ sanctioned non-39 
compliance. However, assessments of non-compliance are rarely straightforward decisions as 40 
implied by Wunder, and need to be adapted to local behaviour (see Keane et al.6 for examples from 41 
conservation). Thus, the type and severity of sanctions need to be negotiated locally with legitimacy 42 
considerations in mind. Other evidence7,8, however, shows that at least some of these projects do 43 
sanction non-compliance by temporarily withholding payments to underperforming farmers until 44 
agreed ‘corrective actions’ have been completed– and that this nuanced approach was developed to 45 
improve programme effectiveness by strengthening the local legitimacy of institutional processes. 46 
Local legitimacy concerns thus interact with and moderate other design features such as sanctioning, 47 
and are mutually supportive. 48 
Our two other concerns are straightforward. First, while we recognise existing evidence that 49 
effective targeting can improve PES effectiveness, other evidence shows that even the most 50 
advanced methods for estimating both opportunity costs9 and likely ecosystem service benefits10, 51 
have limited certainty and precision. Additionally, more complex approaches are likely to be more 52 
costly, which might prevent or impair projects with fewer resources (many of which may coincide 53 
with remote ‘high value’ conservation areas)11. Wunder et al. state that simple targeting is likely 54 
affordable and use examples of national schemes. This may be true for larger schemes with 55 
economies of scale, but is likely to be costly for smaller projects12. Simpler and cheaper approaches 56 
to environmental assessments can be just as effective13. We thus caution against encouraging PES 57 
implementers to invest their limited resources in complex and costly analyses unless the relative 58 
gains are clear. Finding simple and effective methods of targeting remains a key challenge for PES. 59 
Second, and more broadly, the wider PES literature suggests that drivers of effectiveness are far 60 
more diverse than the three design features of spatial targeting, payment differentiation and 61 
sanctioning (for a recent review see Huber-Stearns et al.14). The three design features assessed in 62 
Wunder et al. are an analytical framework (derived from Ezzine-de-Blas et al.15) focused the on 63 
economistic design principles of efficiency and conditionality, rather than a more comprehensive 64 
scoping of factors. The wider PES literature suggests that, while these design features are no doubt 65 
important, they likely offer only partial explanations of PES effectiveness14. 66 
In summary, while we appreciate Wunder et al.’s examination of their selected design principles, we 67 
view that future studies on PES effectiveness should explicitly address the wider social-ecological 68 
context and drivers of environmental interventions and behaviour. 69 
References 70 
1. Wunder, S., Brouwer, R., Engel, S., Ezzine-de-Blas, D., Muradian, R., Pascual, U. and Pinto, R., 71 
2018. From principles to practice in paying for nature’s services. Nature Sustainability, 1(3), 72 
p.145. 73 
2. Pascual, U., Phelps, J., Garmendia, E., Brown, K., Corbera, E., Martin, A., Gomez-Baggethun, 74 
E. and Muradian, R., 2014. Social equity matters in payments for ecosystem services. 75 
Bioscience, 64(11), pp.1027-1036. 76 
3. Fisher, J.A., Cavanagh, C.J., Sikor, T. and Mwayafu, D.M., 2018. Linking notions of justice and 77 
project effectiveness in carbon offset forestry projects: Insights from a comparative study in 78 
Uganda. Land Use Policy, 73, pp.259-268. 79 
4. Kolinjivadi, V., Gamboa, G., Adamowski, J. and Kosoy, N., 2015. Capabilities as justice: 80 
Analysing the acceptability of payments for ecosystem services (PES) through ‘social multi-81 
criteria evaluation’. Ecological Economics, 118, pp.99-113. 82 
5. Börner, J., Baylis, K., Corbera, E., Ezzine-de-Blas, D., Honey-Rosés, J., Persson, U.M. and 83 
Wunder, S., 2017. The effectiveness of payments for environmental services. World 84 
Development, 96, pp.359-374. 85 
6. Keane, A., Jones, J.P., Edwards‐Jones, G. and Milner‐Gulland, E.J., 2008. The sleeping 86 
policeman: understanding issues of enforcement and compliance in conservation. Animal 87 
conservation, 11(2), pp.75-82. 88 
7. Ruiz-De-Oña-Plaza, C., Soto-Pinto, L., Paladino, S., Morales, F. and Esquivel, E., 2011. 89 
Constructing public policy in a participatory manner: from local carbon sequestration 90 
projects to network governance in Chiapas, Mexico. In Carbon sequestration potential of 91 
agroforestry systems (pp. 247-262). Springer, Dordrecht. 92 
8. Peskett, L., Schreckenberg, K. and Brown, J., 2011. Institutional approaches for carbon 93 
financing in the forest sector: learning lessons for REDD+ from forest carbon projects in 94 
Uganda. Environmental science & policy, 14(2), pp.216-229. 95 
9. Lundberg, L., Persson, U.M., Alpizar, F. and Lindgren, K., 2018. Context matters: Exploring 96 
the cost-effectiveness of fixed payments and procurement auctions for PES. Ecological 97 
Economics, 146, pp.347-358. 98 
10. Hou, Y., Burkhard, B. and Müller, F., 2013. Uncertainties in landscape analysis and ecosystem 99 
service assessment. Journal of Environmental Management, 127, pp.S117-S131. 100 
11. Berry, N.J. and Ryan, C.M., 2013. Overcoming the risk of inaction from emissions uncertainty 101 
in smallholder agriculture. Environmental Research Letters, 8(1), p.011003. 102 
12. Milder, J., Scherr, S. and Bracer, C., 2010. Trends and future potential of payment for 103 
ecosystem services to alleviate rural poverty in developing countries. Ecology and Society, 104 
15(2). 105 
13. Wells, G., Fisher, J.A., Porras, I., Staddon, S. and Ryan, C., 2017. Rethinking monitoring in 106 
smallholder carbon payments for ecosystem service schemes: devolve monitoring, 107 
understand accuracy and identify co-benefits. Ecological Economics, 139, pp.115-127. 108 
14. Huber-Stearns, H.R., Bennett, D.E., Posner, S., Richards, R.C., Fair, J.H., Cousins, S.J. and 109 
Romulo, C.L., 2017. Social-ecological enabling conditions for payments for ecosystem 110 
services. Ecology and Society, 22(1). 111 
15. Ezzine-de-Blas, D., Wunder, S., Ruiz-Pérez, M. and del Pilar Moreno-Sanchez, R., 2016. Global 112 
patterns in the implementation of payments for environmental services. PloS one, 11(3), 113 
p.e0149847. 114 
